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1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a ‘non-individuals’ interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. This is not among the well-known interpretations of quantum theory,
such as Bohmian mechanics, the many-worlds interpretation, and GRW. Talk
of non-individuals in quantum mechanics concerns primarily the metaphysics of
the theory (French and Krause [15] and French [14]). However, as we argue,
there is a clear sense in which non-individuality, as a metaphysical concept, is
associated with interpreting quantum mechanics.
Our arguments establish salient connections between interpreting quantum
theory and the metaphysics of quantum individuality. We specify the meaning
of non-individuality and relate it to current efforts regarding the interpretation
of quantum theory. We begin by recalling that an interpretation of quantum
mechanics, as currently understood, is related to solutions to the measurement
problem. Such solutions, we claim, are directly connected to attempts at pro-
viding a picture of what the world looks like according to quantum mechanics.
In particular, we shall advance the claim that an interpretation, in the relevant
sense, brings with it an ontology: an account of what the furniture of the world
is like, according to quantum mechanics. This step takes us from interpretation
to ontology. The shift from ontology to non-individuality is just another, albeit
controversial, further step. Philosophical interest in ontology is typically accom-
panied by interest in articulating a deeper understanding of the nature of the
relevant entities, and a proposal for a metaphysics of non-individuals finds its
way at this point. If quantum mechanics is understood as dealing with objects of
a given kind, whether particles, fields or something else, it may be asked: what
metaphysically are these objects? This, in turn, leads to questions regarding
whether they are individuals or not, and if they are, which principle of indi-
viduality determines that that is the case? The non-individuals interpretation
of quantum mechanics takes the relevant entities as being devoid of individu-
ality, adding a further metaphysical interpretative layer over the theory’s bare
entities. This is known as the Received View of quantum non-individuality (see
French and Krause [15, Chapter 3] for a historical overview).
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This only tells us that a metaphysical view is attached to the ontology of
an interpretation, but it does not specify what non-individuals are, or how the
relevant concepts should be understood. Once a metaphysical interpretation is
connected with an ontology, the task of making the metaphysics explicit still
remains. Considered at this level of generality, the Received View is only a
scheme, rather than a specific thesis. It acquires metaphysical content only
once it is specified what an individual is and how something may fail to be
one—that is, once an articulation of the Received View in metaphysical terms
is provided. We examine two ways of articulating the view: a metaphysically
inflationary form, and a metaphysically deflationary way.
The Received View, as a thesis about the nature of quantum entities, has
its historical roots in the work done by those who first formulated quantum
mechanics. It originates from attempts to understand the nature of the en-
tities described by quantum theory. In particular, quantum particles’ lack of
well-defined trajectories and the presence of permutation invariance contrasted
strikingly with the behavior of classical particles (French and Krause [15, Chap-
ters 2 and 3]). In this way, the Received View, even if considered as adding a
metaphysics over the entities posited by an interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, has a historical pedigree.
This chapter is structured as follows. We begin, in the next section, by
connecting an interpretation of quantum mechanics—understood as aiming to
address the measurement problem—and an ontology. The plan is to make room
to interpret further some entities in metaphysical terms. In Section 3 we dis-
cuss how a metaphysical profile can be attached to such entities, and how a
philosophical motivation is typically offered for such move. We then briefly ex-
amine, in Section 4, the main concepts involved in articulating a metaphysics
of non-individuals. This is followed, in Section 5, by the presentation of what
is perhaps the most well-known metaphysics of non-individuals: one in which
the concept of identity has no place. In Section 6 we analyze a less revision-
ary alternative to the standard account. Finally, in Section 7, a conclusion is
offered.
2 Interpretation and ontology
The idea that a physical theory needs an interpretation is rather recent in the
history of physics, appearing after the development of modern physics itself
(see also the discussion in Mittelstaed [24]). Independently of interpretational
issues in quantum mechanics, the very notions of theory and interpretation
remain subjects of philosophical controversy, but we will not pursue this here
(see Krause and Arenhart [19]). Following Esfeld [12], we take the fact that
quantum theory needs an interpretation to be part of the very aim of that
physical theory. As Esfeld puts it:
[. . . ] a physical theory has to (i) spell out an ontology of what there
is in nature according to the theory, (ii) provide a dynamics for
the elements of the ontology and (iii) deduce measurement outcome
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statistics from the ontology and dynamics by treating measurement
interactions within the ontology and dynamics; in order to do so,
the ontology and dynamics have to be linked with an appropriate
probability measure. Thus, the question is: What is the law that
describes the individual processes that occur in nature (dynamics)
and what are the entities that make up these individual processes
(ontology)? (Esfeld [12, p. 222])
As is well known, to find an appropriate account of the dynamics has been
a key task to ensure the proper formulation and understanding of quantum
mechanics (dynamical laws are crucial to characterize the theory). This is also
a source of difficulty in theory individuation: formulations of quantum theory
that differ in their dynamics may turn out to be distinct theories. Basically, the
problem of formulating a dynamics for quantum entities—whatever they are—is
now known as the measurement problem.
According to the standard way of formulating the measurement problem
(Maudlin [23, p. 7]), the following three apparently reasonable propositions are
inconsistent (despite being pairwise consistent):
1.A The wave-function of a system is complete, i.e., the wave-function
specifies (directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of
a system.
2.A The wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dy-
namical equation (e.g., the Schro¨dinger equation).
3.A Measurements of the spin of an electron (typically) have de-
terminate outcomes, i.e., at the end of the measurement, the
measuring device is either in a state that indicates spin up (and
not down) or spin down (and not up). (Maudlin [23, p. 7])
The major difficulty to ensure consistency comes from having the Schro¨dinger
equation (or something to the same effect) as the dynamics of quantum systems
and having to account for specific and determinate measurement results by us-
ing that very dynamics. The problem derives from the linearity of the equation
and the probabilistic character of quantum theory. When one attempts to de-
scribe a measurement situation composed by a quantum system plugged into a
measurement apparatus through such an equation, one ends up with superposi-
tions of distinct states of the system being measured and distinct measurement
results. The entire system (quantum system + measuring apparatus) typically
does not evolve, following the Schro¨dinger equation, to a definite eigenstate of
the observable being measured and the measuring apparatus pointing to the
correspondent result. Rather, the whole system evolves in a state of super-
position of different states of the system and different states of the apparatus
(associated with distinct measurement results). However, such superpositions
are never observed: only determinate results are. Hence, to restore consistency,
something needs to go.
To provide a solution to the measurement problem is to offer an inter-
pretation of quantum theory. Some interpretations deny that the wave func-
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tion is complete (hidden variables interpretations); others challenge that the
Schro¨dinger equation is the only account of the dynamics; yet others question
that we need determinate outcomes (non-collapse interpretations).
Relevant to us is that the measurement problem is closely connected to the
problem of providing a dynamics to quantum theory. However one addresses this
issue, a problem remains. As noted above, following Esfeld, a physical theory
must provide not only the dynamics, but also an ontology, that is, a more or
less explicit characterization of the entities that are posited by the theory. How
is the problem of ontology related to the measurement problem?
The two problems are closely connected. A dynamics is a dynamics for
the entities postulated by the theory. Different interpretations populate the
world with distinct kinds of entities. The many-worlds interpretation posits a
plurality of worlds, whereas Bohmian mechanics puts forward particles endowed
with trajectories and a pilot wave. Attempts to explain measurements as acts of
conscious activity, in turn, postulate the existence of consciousness apart from
matter. Clearly, interpretations contribute directly to an ontology. As Laura
Ruetsche [27, p. 3433] notes, when one believes in a theory, one believes in an
interpretation of the theory, which provides an account of what the world is like
according to it. Interpretations articulate ontologies for theories.
If ontology is the part of metaphysics concerned with determining the world’s
furniture, to solve the measurement problem involves describing the ontology of
quantum mechanics. In this respect, other chapters in this book advance distinct
ontologies as part of their account of the measurement problem. This makes
ontology importantly related to scientific development, and not something of
just a philosophical concern, making room for a partially naturalistic approach
to ontology (Esfeld [12], Sklar [31]).
In addition to the particular entities postulated by each interpretation, there
is much in common among various interpretations. Most of them posit the exis-
tence of atoms, electrons, protons, etc. (Ladyman [21]). These entities are also
put forward in each formulation of quantum theory; hence, they are part of the
theory’s ontology. But this is not the case for every interpretation of quantum
mechanics. Wave function realism, for instance, populate the world with a wave
function, from which everything else (including particles) should follow. How-
ever, even if these entities are a byproduct of the fundamental ontology, they
must be recovered somehow, and the question regarding their metaphysical sta-
tus is still pertinent. A major problem concerns specifying precisely what kind
of things the entities that are typically dealt with by quantum mechanics are:
particles or fields? What is the picture of reality suggested by the theory?
Modern physics—including quantum mechanics—is formed, to a large ex-
tent, by field theories. Quantum physics is significantly concerned with the
study of quantum fields. “Particles” arise as second-order entities, emerging
when fields interact and momentum and energy are transferred, so that certain
field excitations arise. The excitations (the “particles”) come in units, namely,
in 1, 2, . . . , n units of excitation. The interactions increase or decrease the num-
ber of excitations by one and they are supposed to happen in space and time, so
that the excitations behave as particles, hence the term. However, when an ex-
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periment with cathode rays is conducted, one (supposedly) see electron beams,
rather than electrons, despite the way one describes them. When neutral hy-
drogen atoms are ionized, it is with electrons that one interacts empirically,
not with a mathematical field. When something is accelerated, mathematical
fields or wave functions are not accelerated, but “particles” are. Although the
mathematical formalism refers to a mathematical entity called ‘field’, a particle
interpretation needs to be provided to accommodate with these empirical cir-
cumstances. The vocabulary of experimental physics is mostly a vocabulary of
particles. Even if we can dispense with the notion of particle when it comes to
mathematics, talk of particles still remains in the experimental front. Michael
Redhead talks about the “particle grin”, by comparing the situation with the
Cheshire cat (French and Krause [15, p. 361]).
In orthodox quantum mechanics, before the advent of quantum field theories,
the systems were supposed to behave either as particles or as waves, but never
as both. The terms “particles” and “waves” were taken from analogies with
what was known from classical physics and ordinary experience. In quantum
mechanics, there is limited knowledge of the real entities under investigation,
except for what is postulated by the theory.
These are the quantum objects we will focus on. According to the Received
View of quantum non-individuality, the behavior of entities of this kind, inde-
pendently of whether they are described by orthodox quantum mechanics or
field theories, is not compatible with the traditional metaphysical conception
of individuals. This chapter aims to make these points clear. But, first, we
need to say a bit more about the key concepts involved in the metaphysics of
individuality.
3 Non-individuality and metaphysical profiles
Once it is acknowledged that particles of some kind need to be accommodated,
a further question arises: what kind of things are these objects? A philosoph-
ical theory about objects may be considered, and the question about whether
quantum entities are individuals becomes central. Moreover, if the tradition is
followed, and if particular entities must have an individuation principle, accord-
ing to which principle of individuation should we individuate quantum entities?
To come to grips with these questions, a proper understanding of principles
of individuation is called for. We will consider the issue in the next section.
First, we motivate the need for engaging with metaphysics when it comes to
quantum entities. Historically, such entities have been treated as lacking indi-
viduality, in an informal sense. Some of the founding fathers of quantum theory
noted the odd behavior of quantum entities, and thought that this required
close consideration (French and Krause [15, Chapter 3]). Erwin Schro¨dinger, in
particular, examined the issue attentively. He starts an essay on the nature of
quanta explicitly claiming that quantum entities have no individuality:
This essay deals with the elementary particle, more particularly with
a certain feature that this concept has acquired—or rather lost—
5
in quantum mechanics. I mean this: that the elementary particle
is not an individual; it cannot be identified, it lacks “sameness”.
[. . . ] In technical language it is covered by saying that the particles
“obey” a new fangled statistics, either Bose-Einstein or Fermi-Dirac
statistics. The implication, far from obvious, is that the unsuspected
epithet “this” is not quite properly applicable to, say, an electron,
except with caution, in a restricted sense, and sometimes not at all.
(Schro¨dinger [29, p. 197])
Note that Schro¨dinger directly relates what he saw as a new metaphysical
character of quanta (they are not individuals, cannot be identified, lack “same-
ness”) with quantum statistics. Quantum statistics is connected with permuta-
tion symmetry in quantum mechanics, which leads to quanta being indiscernible
by any observable available in the theory. As will become clear, this relation
between statistics and new metaphysical features of the entities is not as direct
as Schro¨dinger expected, although any kind of metaphysical approach to quan-
tum mechanics will need to accommodate the odd statistics and be compatible
with it.
Crucial for us is that the lack of individuality, which emerges directly from
quantum theory (at least from a historical point of view), is a metaphysical
question about the metaphysical status of the particles regarding their individ-
uality. While some may think that considering the nature of quantum entities
may lead us too far from the theory itself—due to the fact that the problem
of individuality is a metaphysics problem—Schro¨dinger (among others) saw the
connection between non-individuality and physics as a pretty direct one. Fur-
thermore, according to some philosophers, it is only after such questions about
the nature of the relevant entities are properly addressed that one can be con-
fident of having a clear picture of what one is accepting when the theory is
accepted. Steven French, in particular, dubs this demand for a metaphysical
picture Chakravartty’s challenge, given Anjan Chakravartty’s identification of
the need for a metaphysical clarification for a reasonable articulation of real-
ism (French [13]; French and Krause [15, p. 244] explicitly emphasize the need
for a metaphysical articulation of the ontology). Whether Chakravartty him-
self agrees with this understanding of his own work is a matter of controversy
(Chakravartty [5]). French continues:
But how do we obtain this clear picture? A simple answer would
be, through physics which gives us a certain picture of the world as
including particles, for example. But is this clear enough? Consider
the further, but apparently obvious, question, are this particles in-
dividual objects, like chairs, tables, or people are? In answering this
question, we need to supply, I maintain, or at least allude to, an
appropriate metaphysics of individuality, and this exemplifies the
general claim that in order to obtain Chakravartty’s clear picture
and hence obtain an appropriate realist understanding we need to
provide an appropriate metaphysics. Those who reject any such need
are either closet empiricists or ‘ersatz’ realists. (French [13, p. 48])
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In other words, in addition to the ontology—the items posited by a theory—
further metaphysical questions still need to be addressed (Arenhart [2]). In
particular, if the entities a theory posits are particulars, questions about identity
and individuality arise quite directly.
This suggests that a further interpretational layer must be added to the
posits of a theory, a layer involving something like the metaphysical profile of
the relevant entities. This metaphysical layer does not perform any role in the
solution to the measurement problem, or to fix the ontology that comes with
such solution. Rather, it is presupposed that the ontology is already in place,
and one works from there. This suggests that one cannot extract the metaphys-
ical profile of the entities from the theory, as Schro¨dinger had suggested, but
rather must impose it from above.
One could ask why this extra step is required. As French suggested in the
quotation above, addressing these issues is the only way to articulate a com-
pletely realistic view of what the world is like according to the theory in question.
Otherwise, something will be missing. But whether or not one takes this extra
step, we take it that individuality and non-individuality are metaphysical issues
that add an additional layer to the description of reality provided by quantum
theory. In this sense, one shifts from a mere operational use of quantum theory
to an interpreted version of the theory, and from there, to an interpretation
plugged with a metaphysical characterization of its posits. This leads one, in
principle, to a fuller version of the theory.
We can now examine what individuality is (and its absence), and some of
the accompanying concepts of identity, indiscernibility, and identification.
4 Individuals, individuation, and identity
There is a lot of ambiguity in discussions of quantum identity and individuality.
Unfortunately, such ambiguities contaminate also formulations of the Received
View and, as a consequence, some of its criticisms. In this section, we specify
more precisely the meaning of the terms we use. This will inform our examina-
tion of the approaches to the Received View that will be developed in the next
sections (see also Krause and Arenhart [20], and Arenhart, Krause and Bueno
[3]).
By identity we mean the logical relation of identity, typically symbolized by
the binary predicate symbol ‘=’. A sentence involving the identity symbol, such
as ‘a = b’ describes a relation that, intuitively speaking, is true when a and
b are names of one and the same thing, and is false when a names a distinct
object from b. Obviously, this explanation of the meaning of identity is circular,
but it is not supposed to work as a definition of identity. (The issue of whether
identity can be defined or explained in more basic terms is delicate, and many
argue that identity is fundamental; see Bueno [4] and Shumener [30] for further
discussion.)
Typically, identity is presented by its first-order logical axioms:
Reflexivity ∀x(x = x)
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Substitution law x = y → (α→ α[y/x]), with the known restrictions.
The law of substitution, in its first-order version, states that terms that are
related by identity in any formula can be replaced by one another without dis-
turbing the truth value of such formula. In material terms, it becomes the
law of the indiscernibility of identicals, which states that identical things are
indiscernible by properties and relations. With regard to the relation between
identity and indiscernibility, this is only half of the story, with identity im-
plying indiscernibility. The other half is much more controversial, stating that
indiscernibility implies identity. This is the famous principle of identity of indis-
cernibles (PII). In material terms, it states that items that share all properties
and relations are numerically identical. In first-order languages, PII is stated as
a schema:
PII (α(x)↔ α(x/y))→ x = y
PII has counterexamples in first-order languages (it is enough to use a poor
language), not being a truth of first-order logic. The metaphysical thesis (the
material reading), however, has proved more resistant. In quantum mechanics,
controversy around the principle is notorious. While some have claimed that
it is a false principle in quantum theory (French and Krause [15, Chapter 4]),
others have tried to save weaker versions of the principle, going as far as to claim
that quantum mechanics proves weaker versions of PII (Muller and Saunders
[25]). We will not engage with this particular controversy in this chapter.
Finally, we need also to specify what is meant by the notion of individual.
According to the Online Etymology Dictionary, “individual” is a Medieval term
that means “single object or thing”. In other usages of the term, for instance in
Middle English, “individuum was used in [the] sense of ‘individual member of a
species’ (early 15c.)”. In current metaphysics, one of the tasks of metaphysicians
consists in explaining what is it that confers individuality to an individual, that
is, what is it that makes that individual precisely the individual that it is. As
Jonathan Lowe [22, p. 75] has put it, the role of an individuation principle with
regard to an object is to account for “whatever it is that makes it the single
object that it is—whatever it is that makes it one object, distinct from others,
and the very object that it is as opposed to any other thing”.
The notion of individual is related to the notion of numerical identity, but
not, necessarily, with the notion of discernibility. In other words, individual-
ity does not exclude the possibility that “different” individuals have the same
qualitative features. After all, an “individual member of a species” need not be
discernible from other members. The additional supposition that every individ-
ual should be a unity discernible from other individuals was a central piece in
Leibniz’s metaphysics, which adopts PII. This principle, in turn, is responsible
for the connection between identity and indiscernibility. The idea that identity
is grounded in qualitative features has its epistemic attractions, but it is not re-
quired by the notion of individuality. It remains an open issue whether to adopt
an individuality principle that links identity with indiscernibility as articulated
by PII, or else to leave open the possibility that individuals can be indiscernible.
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5 Non-individuals, lack of identity
As just noted, the concepts of identity, individuality and indiscernibility can be
understood as being largely independent. These concepts can now be used to
frame a metaphysics of non-individuality; one that contributes to the metaphys-
ical profile of quantum entities. This is required for a more complete picture of
what the world looks like according to quantum mechanics.
Schro¨dinger, it was noted above, declared that quantum entities lost their
individuality. What emerges from this, we take it, is the need to specify a
connection between quantum theory and a metaphysics of non-individuality.
To examine this issue, consider another passage in which Schro¨dinger stresses
the point:
I beg to emphasize this and I beg you to believe it: it is not a
question of our being able to ascertain the identity in some instances
and not being able to do so in others. It is beyond doubt that the
question of ‘sameness’, of identity, really and truly has no meaning.
(Schro¨dinger [28, pp. 121-122])
Strictly speaking, Schro¨dinger is claiming that sameness and identity fail to
make sense for quantum entities. This is not obviously the same as to claim
that quantum entities are non-individuals in light of the distinctions we made
above. How can we make sense of this claim metaphysically? In what follows,
a particular approach is developed that puts some metaphysical flesh on the
bones of the Received View, as described above, and which attempts to capture
the literal reading of ‘losing identity’, as Schro¨dinger suggested.
Consider again the notion of individuality. There must be something that
accounts for what an entity is, and makes it precisely that entity. Some have
thought that an entity must be an individual in virtue of possessing a special
non-qualitative property of being identical to itself, and that this is what ex-
plains its individuality. Socrates is an individual in virtue of being endowed
with the property of ‘being identical to Socrates’. Nothing else has this prop-
erty, only Socrates. Hence, this accounts for the difference between Socrates
and everything else, as a kind of individual essence. At the same time, this is a
non-qualitative property: one cannot use it to qualitatively distinguish Socrates
from anything else. That means that, in terms of qualities, two individuals may
coincide, while still having different essences—their non-qualitative individuat-
ing properties. In terms of the concepts formulated in the previous section, two
items may be numerically distinct individuals, but at the same time be quali-
tatively indiscernible. This non-qualitative property is called in the literature a
‘haecceity’. Individuals are the individuals they are in virtue of their haecceity.
Typically, a haecceity is expressed in terms of self-identity: Socrates’s haecceity
is expressed by the fact that ‘Socrates = Socrates’. It is, in other terms, the
property of ‘being identical to Socrates’.
This approach to individuality accommodates the link between individuality
and identity, and also, as French and Krause [15] have observed, between lack
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of identity and lack of individuality, which is presumably what Schro¨dinger
had in mind—although Schro¨dinger would not have made the point in terms
of haecceity. French and Krause consider principles of individuality that rely
on non-qualitative features to provide a form of transcendental individuality—
and haecceitism is not the only one available, although it is our focus here
(French and Krause [15, Chapter 1]). If individuality is related to identity as
just suggested, failure of identity amounts to failure of individuality. The case
for non-individuality is then made metaphysically: a non-individual is something
that has no haecceity, and given what haecceities are, non-individuals are entities
for which self-identity fails. As French and Krause note:
[. . . ] the idea is apparently simple: regarded in haecceistic terms,
“Transcendental Individuality” can be understood as the identity of
an object with itself; that is, ‘a = a’. We shall then defend the claim
that the notion of non-individuality can be captured in the quantum
context by formal systems in which self-identity is not always well-
defined, so that the reflexive law of identity, namely, ∀x(x = x), is
not valid in general. (French and Krause [15, pp. 13-14])
We will sketch below a way of articulating the approach formally, preserving
the close connection between identity and individuality that is central to the
conception. As French and Krause point out:
We are supposing a strong relationship between individuality and
identity [. . . ] for we have characterized ‘non-individuals’ as those
entities for which the relation of self-identity a = a does not make
sense. (French and Krause [15, p. 248])
As a result, it is possible to advance a metaphysical conception of non-
individuality along the lines suggested by Schro¨dinger. Understood in this way,
non-individuals are indiscernible by their properties. This is a physical issue,
rather than a logical or philosophical one. We may approach indiscernibility in
the way physicists do: the relevant entities are characterized by physical laws.
Electrons, for instance, are those entities specified by a law according to which
a mass m = 9.109× 10−31 kg and a charge e = −4.80320451(10)× 10−10 esu is
always accompanied by spin 1/2~, a Bohr magneton, etc. (see Toraldo di Francia
[34, p. 342]; ‘esu’ is the abbreviation for the electrostactic unity of charge).
These entities are, on di Francia’s suggestive terminology, nomological objects.
In other words, one does not analyze these objects in order to obtain their
properties; the properties are specified by the relevant theory. It then emerges
that all electrons are absolutely indiscernible. (This idea can be questioned,
though; see Dieks [9].)
5.1 The mathematics
On the Received View, we noted, non-individuals are entities devoid of a haecce-
ity and, hence, cannot figure in the relation of identity. They are also nomolog-
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ical entities, which are specified by physical laws, and do not obey the standard
theory of identity. We will examine it now.
The considerations so far motivate the development of a formal system to
accommodate non-individuals, along the lines suggested by French and Krause
[15] (see, in particular, the quote above). The key idea is that these entities
can be aggregated in collections, which are called quasi-sets and can have a
cardinal, but not an ordinal. Non-individuals do not bear unambiguous names
or identifications. Given the lack of a haecceity, all of them would have the same
“identity card”, which is, thus, useless. But non-individuals of different kinds
(e.g. electrons and positrons) can be distinguished from one another, such as,
by their electric charge (the positron’s charge is the opposite of the electron’s).
However, since they do not obey the theory of identity, it is not appropriate to
claim that they are different. Talk of discernible and indiscernible is enough.
All of this conflicts with standard logic and mathematics. Let us start with
the notion of identity. Identity can be either defined or taken as primitive.
Suppose we have a language with just three primitive predicate symbols: P and
Q are unary symbols, whereas R is binary. It can then be stated that:
x = y := (P (x)↔ P (y)) ∧ (Q(x)↔ Q(y))
∧ ∀z(R(x, z)↔ R(y, z)) ∧ ∀z(R(z, x)↔ R(z, y)). (1)
This can be generalized to any finite quantity of predicates. Of course,
this offers no definition of numerical identity, and provides only indiscernibility
relative to the language’s predicates. It would be better to indicate this fact
with x ∼ y. The same objection can be raised against any attempt to use
equivalence relations or congruences to stand for identity. For reasons that
will emerge shortly, these strategies only hide the problem, making individuals
appear to be non-individuals, while they are not. But why are they not?
The reasons have to do with set theory, the typical framework in which
to develop all standard mathematics. Take a system such as ZFC, Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (we are not including ur-elements
for now). Axiomatized as a first-order theory, as is now usual, ZFC has ‘=’ as
a primitive binary symbol, satisfying the following axiom schema:
1. (=1) ∀x(x = x) (Reflexive Law of Identity).
2. (=2) ∀x∀y(x = y → (α(x) → α(y))), in which α(x) is a formula (that
may contain parameters), x is free and α(y) is obtained from α(x) by the
substitution of some free occurrences of x by y (Axiom of Substitution of
Identicals).
3. (=3) ∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y) (Extensionality Axiom).
The converse of the extensionality axiom follows from (=2). It is also easy
to prove that identity is symmetric and transitive. For our purposes, the key
consequence is that the universe of sets—the von Neumann cumulative hier-
archy of well-founded sets V = 〈V,∈〉 (Jech [17])—does not have nontrivial
automorphisms. This has important implications.
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First, from a set-theoretic perspective, mathematics is conducted inside a
mathematical structure. A group is a structure of the kind G = 〈G, ?〉; a vector
space is a structure of the form V = 〈V,K,+, ·〉; a classical particle mechanics
is a structure CPM = 〈P, s,m, f ,g〉 (McKinsey et al. 1953), and so on. These
structures are (or can be viewed as) sets of ZFC. Let E = 〈D,Ri〉 be a structure,
in which relations Ri hold for the elements of the domain D (all other structures
can be reduced to this case). Two objects a and b, which belong to D, are E-
indiscernible if there is an automorphism h of E such that h(a) = b (thus,
h−1(b) = a). As an illustration, i and −i are C-indiscernible in the complex
field structure C, for the operation of taking the conjugate is an automorphism.
Structures that have automorphisms other than the identity function are said
to be deformable, or non-rigid ; otherwise, they are rigid.
A significant theorem states that every structure can be extended to a rigid
structure (da Costa & Rodrigues [7]). This means that the apparently indis-
cernible objects of the domain of a given structure can be individuals with
identity on the outside of it. Furthermore, recall that the whole universe is
rigid. So, within a mathematical framework, such as ZF, ZFC, NBG, KM and
other “standard” set theories, indiscernible things can only be taken to be E-
indiscernible for some structure E . This maneuver is adopted when congruence
relations are used to stand for identity. Good foundational work should avoid
this trick.
To conclude this section, some remarks on set theories with ur-elements are
in order (see Suppes [33]). Ur-elements are entities that are not sets but can be
members of sets. They do not have elements, relative to a membership relation,
although they can obey mereological axioms. Set theories with ur-elements are
useful for applications in the empirical sciences, in which many objects, such
as eucalyptuses, elephants, and electrons, are not sets, but can be members of
them.
Let A be the set of ur-elements. It is known that every permutation on A
can be extended to an automorphism of the entire universe, which is not rigid,
in contrast to the universe of “pure” sets. This means that, in certain situations,
two ur-elements apparently could not be discerned by any means and so they
might be good candidates to represent quantum objects. However, this should
be viewed with suspicion. Even ur-elements obey the axiom of pairing, which
states that given sets a and b of ur-elements, there is a set z that has only
a and b as its elements. If a = b, the unitary of a is denoted by {a}. The
“property” Ia(x) ↔ x ∈ {a}, which is called the identity of a and is satisfied
only by a, can then be defined. This property can be used to establish, as a
consequence of PII, that a has something that is not shared by any other object
in the universe. Hence, although ur-elements can be taken to be indiscernible,
they are not. They do have identity: every ur-element is distinct from any other
entity in the universe.
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5.2 A more appropriate mathematics
We noted that if quantum objects are non-individuals, this does not entail that
they cannot be discerned in some cases: quantum entities of different kinds,
such as electrons and protons, can be distinguished. But the fact that these
objects are discernible in certain instances does not grant them identity. Since
standard set theories presuppose the identity of all objects in their domains,
they are not adequate to study entities of this sort. To address this issue, a
novel set theory has been articulated. We now provide some details about it.
Quasi-sets are collections of objects some of which lack identity conditions,
that is, they are non-individuals. Other elements satisfy the rules of standard
logic, including those of identity. Those that do are individuals; they are either
sets or ur-elements. When restricted to individuals, the theory yields a copy of
ZFU, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with ur-elements. The latter are M -objects,
whereas non-individuals are m-objects (M for “macro”, m for “micro”). The
theory allows for m-objects of several kinds, and can accommodate protons,
electrons, positrons, and so on. Although m-objects of a given kind, e.g. elec-
trons, may or may not be discerned, one cannot claim that they are different,
for identity does not apply to them.
Operations on quasi-sets are similar to those on sets: intersection, union,
and power set, for instance, are all specified for quasi-sets. A quasi-set may
have a cardinal, but when indistinguishable m-objects are involved, no ordinal
can be associated to it. So, a quasi-set cannot be ordered, named, or labelled
without ambiguity (see French and Krause [15]). Given these remarks, we can
now examine how this theory can be used to do physics.
5.3 Quantum physics
The main philosophical problem regarding quantum physics does not concern
the results of the theory. These are well established and properly supported.
The problem concerns interpretation. Our aim is to present a reasonable ac-
count of quantum theory that takes quantum objects, which are, in any case,
involved in any interpretation, as non-individuals. We consider how a different
mathematical theory can accommodate this point.
The application of quasi-set theory involves various steps, culminating in
a formulation of quantum theory in terms of quasi-sets. On standard formu-
lations, quantum objects themselves (or quantum systems) appear only in an
indirect way. Despite Max Jammer’s comment to the effect that the theory’s
primitive notions include system (Jammer [16, p. 5]), the standard formalism is
formulated in terms of states and observables. (There is no need to review the
axioms here. We just note that there are plenty of different alternative ways
of formulating quantum mechanics: Styer et al. [32] present nine.) On the
standard formulations, it is assumed that there is a set of quantum systems to
begin with. However, sets from classical set theories, such as those mentioned
above, are collections of distinct objects. The members of a set must have iden-
tity: they are individuals. Thus, something goes wrong if sets are assumed in
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this context. Our proposal is to assume that quantum systems form a quasi-set
instead.
At least two ways are available to accommodate quantum mechanics in quasi-
set theory. The first concerns non-relativistic quantum mechanics, QM. The
core idea was advanced in Krause and Arenhart (2017, §5.8.1), and explicitly
assumes, as in the case of classical particle mechanics mentioned earlier, that
there is a quasi-set of quantum systems, S, such that some of them, depending
on the particular model under consideration, can be indiscernible. The structure
has the form:
QM =
〈
S, {Hi}, {Aˆij}, {Uik},B(R)
〉
, i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K (2)
in which:
1. S is a quasi-set whose elements are called physical objects, or physical
systems.
2. {Hi} is a family of complex separable Hilbert spaces whose cardinality is
defined in the particular application of the theory.
3. {Aˆij}, for each Hilbert space Hi, is a family of self-adjunct (or Hermitian)
operators over Hi.
4. {Uik}, again for each Hi, is a family of unitary operators over Hi.
5. B(R) is the collection of Borel sets over the set of real numbers.
The Hilbert space formalism, whose postulates we will review in a moment,
does not involve space and time, something needed in order to apply it to the
world. We will return to this point.
To each quantum system s ∈ S, we associate a 4-tuple of the form:
σ = 〈E4, ψ(x, t),∆, P 〉, (3)
in which E4 is the Galilean spacetime (see Penrose [26, Chapter 17]), such that
each point is denoted by a 4-tuple 〈x, y, z, t〉, in which x = 〈x, y, z〉 denotes the
coordinates of the system and t is a parameter representing time. ψ(x, t) is a
function over E4, which is called the wave function of the system. ∆ ∈ B(R) is
Borelian. P is a function defined in Hi × {Aˆij} × B(R), for some i (determined
by the physical system s), and having values in [0, 1]. Thus, P (ψ, Aˆ,∆) ∈ [0, 1]
is the probability that the measurement of the observable A (represented by the
self-adjunct operator Aˆ) for the system in state ψ(x, t) lies in ∆.
The relation between the state vector and the wave function is given as
follows: Let (x, t) denote the position operator at time t. Then ψ(x, t) =
〈(x, t)|ψ〉, that is, the wave-function is described by the Fourier coefficients
of the expansion of the state vector in the orthonormal basis of the position
operator.
Suitable postulates connecting all these concepts need not be reviewed here
(Krause and Arenhart 2017). The key shift is the adoption of quasi-set theory.
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This approach is able to resolve the difficulties raised by Dalla Chiara and
Toraldo di Francia [6] about the interpretation of a language L of quantum
mechanics if it is formulated in a standard set theory, such as ZFC. We review
some of their arguments and explain why these criticisms do not hold in quasi-set
theory.
1. The standard interpretation assumes that its domain D is a set of indi-
viduals. In contrast, in quasi-set theory, the domain includes a quasi-set
of indiscernible entities, so that some quantum objects can be taken to be
indiscernible without the usual tricks.
2. For any individual d ∈ D in the standard interpretation, the language can
be extended to a language L′, which contains a name a and a denotation
function ρ, such that ρ(a) = d. In quasi-set theory, this is not the case, for
m-objects cannot be named. In fact, a suitable language for QM should
not allow for proper names.
3. If L is at least a second-order language, Leibniz’s PII holds in standard
semantics:
∀x∀y(x 6= y → ∃F (F (x) ∧ ¬F (y))).
In contrast, in quasi-set theory, this principle fails for indiscernible m-
objects, for no haecceity is assumed and they may share all their properties
and relations.
The second approach to use quasi-set theory to accommodate quantum me-
chanics focuses on the Fock space formalism. This was started in Domenech
et. al. [11] and [10]. The Fock space formalism includes creation and annihi-
lation operators, making room for (non-interacting) fields. In the papers just
mentioned, two kinds of vector spaces (Hilbert spaces) are defined; they are
called quasi-spaces—one for bosons, another for fermions. The main idea is
that, by positing that some entities can be strongly indiscernible, it is possible
to dispense with certain postulates, such as the indistinguishability postulate.
Quantum results emerge naturally with this move.
Moreover, within quasi-set theory, the so-called quantum statistics (B-E and
F-D) are obtained quite naturally too. Given that certain objects can be indis-
cernible in a strong sense, the formulas that provide the counting states in both
B-E and F-D statistics can be obtained just by counting the states—without
having to discharge some of them, as is usual in the standard approach, to mimic
indiscernibility. In this respect, the quasi-set-theoretic framework seems to be
much more natural for the quantum domain (French and Krause 2006, §7.6).
In quasi-set theory, not only indiscernible objects can be considered, but
also indiscernible properties. As is well known, to arrive at statistical predictions
from the quantum formalism, the same experiments need to be repeated enough
times to allow for the computation of mean values and probabilities, and the
determination of all necessary stochastic properties of experimental outcomes.
But what counts as “the same experiment”? De Barros, Holik and Krause [8]
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elaborated on this notion to underscore how indistinguishability is deeply con-
nected to contextuality. They realized that in order to perform n experiments,
physicists must prepare n “identical” copies of a same quantum system. But,
given the indistinguishability postulate—according to which different mean val-
ues in permutations of indistinguishable objects is not observable—the particles
involved cannot be identified. Interestingly, this is so even if we perform a
thought experiment, provided that we want to respect what the logic of QM
seems to suggest regarding identity, at least given an interpretation of quantum
theory.
When considering indistinguishable properties, we neither perform “the same”
experiment twice nor measure two indistinguishable properties on “the same”
quantum system, but we measure indistinguishable properties—prepared in “the
same” way—over indistinguishable quantum systems. Thus, by seriously con-
sidering the notion of indistinguishability as something distinct from identity,
something that quasi-set theory enables us to do, we can read the results by
Kochen and Specker and realize that the core of their theorem (the “paradox”)
can be avoided, for the contradiction assumes that “the same” properties are
measured in “the same” particles in different contexts. However, if we assume
the apparently obvious fact that we measure indistinguishable properties over
indistinguishable particles, there will be no surprise in acknowledging that the
obtained results may differ. In other words, within this context, the Kochen-
Specker result can be put within parentheses (de Barros et al. [8]).
6 Non-individuals with identity
Despite the developments in the Received View, some may argue that the loss
of identity, as an expressive resource, is just too much to swallow. The relation
between identity and individuality that was suggested leads to a relation of
identity heavily burdened by the metaphysical role of individuation—a role that,
according to some, identity should not have. But for those who want to keep
the idea that quantum mechanics does not deal with individuals, some options
are still available. Given the distinctions we provided regarding identity and
individuality, loss of individuality need not entail loss of identity. So, even if
one is not willing to embrace the version of the Received View above, there is
no need to abandon the Received View altogether, formulated as the thesis that
quantum entities are non-individuals. It is enough to apply distinct principles of
individuality, and to consider those whose failure do not imply lack of identity
(Arenhart [1], and Krause and Arenhart [20]).
Here we present an alternative version of the Received View that allows us to
have non-individuals while identity is still maintained. Of course, in this context,
identity and individuality must be separated: the fact that one may use identity
to refer to some entities does not imply that they have a haecceity. To do so,
identity should be deflated from the metaphysical content it had been burdened
with in the previous approach, and individuality endowed with more epistemic
features. Recall that an individual is a unity of some kind. The idea gains a
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twist with the addition that an individual is something that can be repeatedly
identified as being the same individual, that is, it requires identification over
time.
Bueno’s approach to individuality in [4] provides one such option. According
to his approach, an individual must satisfy two conditions:
Discernibility: The item is discernible from any other individual.
Re-identification: The item is re-identifiable over time.
Although identity can be employed in the formulation of these conditions, the
fact that certain entities have identity, by itself, does not confer them individu-
ality. As Bueno [4] remarks, this account of individuality is compatible with a
view in which the relation of identity is devoid of metaphysical content. Interest-
ingly, a notion of non-individuality also emerges: a non-individual is something
that fails to be an individual. As a result, three kinds of non-individuals are
obtained. Something is a non-individual provided that (i) it is indiscernible
from others of its kind; or (ii) it lacks conditions of identification over time;
or (iii) it is indiscernible from other entities of its kind and lacks conditions of
identification over time. Quantum entities, on a reasonable interpretation, are
non-individuals according to the third option.
As noted above, the typical version of the Received View states that non-
individuals are entities without identity. However, if the Received View is merely
the thesis that quantum entities are non-individuals, the proposal we have pre-
sented here also provides a formulation of the Received View. This approach
has an interesting historical motivation. Consider again Schro¨dinger’s quote
that supports the previous version of the Received View:
I beg to emphasize this and I beg you to believe it: it is not a
question of our being able to ascertain the identity in some instances
and not being able to do so in others. It is beyond doubt that the
question of ‘sameness’, of identity, really and truly has no meaning.
(Schro¨dinger [28, pp. 121-122])
In this passage, Schro¨dinger is not completely clear about what it is meant
by ‘identity’. Perhaps the failure is not of numerical identity, but rather of
identity over time. As he notes, in a given experiment, one cannot claim, with
full certainty, that a particle that appears at an instant t1 in a bubble chamber
is the same that appears at a later instant t2. The particle’s identity cannot
be determined because it cannot be re-identified in distinct instants of time.
So, what fails is not the particle’s numerical identity, but its identity over time.
This makes such a particle a non-individual according to proposal (ii) above.
If non-individuals are items lacking individuality in this second sense—that
is, they cannot be re-identified over time—Hans Dehmelt’s positron Priscilla as
well as other quantum objects he has trapped are non-individuals. After all, as
soon as they leave the apparatus that trapped them, these objects cannot be
identified anymore. This is not just an epistemological feature, but belongs to
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the very nature of these entities. (The same happens with more recent trapped
quantum objects by Haroche and Wineland; for a discussion of Priscilla, see
Krause [18].)
One of the benefits of this approach is that it does not require revising the
logic of identity. Quantum theory, however, does not favor one metaphysics
over another. Thus, not only is quantum mechanics empirically underdeter-
mined, given that its data are compatible with distinct interpretations, but it is
also metaphysically underdetermined: there is no specific quantum mechanical
support for a preferred metaphysical interpretation of its entities. This is as
it should be: metaphysical interpretations were designed to provide answers to
metaphysical questions rather than to problems connected to the applications
of the theory.
7 Conclusions
In quantum mechanics, similarly to what happens in arithmetic, one starts
with informal notions. A puzzle emerges when it is realized that quantum
“particles” have lost their individuality. To make sense of this, a more fine-
grained framework, which does not presuppose the identity of the objects under
consideration, is called for. Such framework, articulated in quasi-set theory,
offers the basis for an interpretation of quantum mechanics with regard to the
nature of the entities in question.
Of course, one can be an instrumentalist about quantum theory, refuse to
engage with these issues, and insist that QM only provides tools for computing
probabilities. But something would be missing. One can be legitimately inter-
ested in the world views that QM offers. One of them suggests that quantum
objects are better thought of as non-individuals. We take this view seriously,
and have provided a logic and a mathematics compatible with it. And a signif-
icant source of understanding regarding the foundations of quantum mechanics
then results.
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